

高類番号才二。N号

Doc 220 N

日本外交関係才二卷一九三二—一九四一年度二八五頁  
一九四〇年五月十一日國務省より出せしタル新聞發表六註  
蘭領東印度現狀ニ関スル東京ヨリノ新聞報道通ニ関シ  
通信員カラノ所質問ニ答テ、國務長官ハ、聲明ヲ行フ。  
東京ヨリノ新聞發表ニ於ケル他質問、件ニ就テハ、私ハ答  
ヲ報告ヲ受ケテナシ。コ、數週間ニ、イギリス、日本及露國  
國々全ハ、政府ハ、蘭領東印度現狀ニ對シテ、總テ  
同ニテ有レテナルトイフ、各自ノ態度ヲ、公式發表ニヨリテ明  
ラカニシタ。

コレハ一九三三年書面ニヨリテ公式ニ行ハル確タル公約上發  
スルモノデアリタ。也、政府ハ公約ヲ行ツテ諸政府ハ各々ノ  
公約ヲ忠守スルデアラウト假定スル。一九四〇年四月十七日  
私ハ公式聲明ニ於テ次ノヤウニ述ベタ。

Ex 1287

「蘭領印度、國內問題ハ、干渉モ又ハ平和的干渉  
以外ニモルソ、現狀、如何ナル變更モ、早ニ蘭印領土  
ノミテ又全太平洋地域ニ於ケル安定、平和及  
安全、根源ニ對シテ有害トナレタラハ、」

「コレノ事實ニ鑑ミ、蘭領東印度、現狀ヲ尊重セシモ  
意圖、公約及表明ハ、幾度繰返サシテモ決シテ過ギルコト  
ヲハタイナレ」

六註一九四〇年五月十一日國務省告示第三卷四六号四三頁、後

C. # 1288

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Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 285-288  
836B.01/22

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

(Washington,) May 16, 1940.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He did not mention the Philippine Immigration Bill, or the reported Japanese disturbances in Peru, or, expressly, the Netherlands Indies, or the status of European armed forces in China. At the beginning of the conversation I made reference to the increased state of war and chaos in other parts of the world and the terrible destructive effects of it in every way, adding that it appeared more and more as if no large country, much less a small country, was safe from some aggressive intervention by force in one way or another, and that about the only thing a nation could do was to arm to the teeth and be ready for any serious interference with its rights and interests by the use of military force or the threat of force. I said that, fortunately, as was shown today in Congress, and as was apparent all over the nation since the more recent invasions of helpless peaceful nations for purposes of their destruction, the American people have now become thoroughly awakened, aroused and alert in regard to any threatened injuries to American rights and interests, and that this was a matter of great gratification to those of us in charge of the foreign affairs of the nation.

The Ambassador then proceeded at great length to question and cross-examine me about the Netherlands West Indies, comprising Curacao and Aruba. I said that, of course, my Government and the other twenty-one American Republics would not consider for a moment any departure from their traditional policy relating to the safety of this hemisphere, and if that was what the Ambassador had in mind, I could make that statement together with the further statement that as soon as this Government learned of the fact that British and French vessels patrolling the waters near Curacao and Aruba were offering potential aid to the Netherlands Government in preventing possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments on one or both of these possessions, such as governments are often seized in South American countries, this Government proceeded to assemble the facts as expeditiously as possible in regard to the ability of Netherlands guards and citizens in Curacao and Aruba to protect the islands and their governments from such dangers. I further stated that it was my understanding that the British and French patrols were in no sense interfering with the Netherlands government on these two islands, but were recognizing the authority of these governments during the brief temporary time deemed necessary to aid in safeguarding against the dangers already mentioned, and that they have made it clear that thereafter their patrols will not offer any guards for additional protection in connection with their continued patrol work, and hence there cannot arise the slightest question of interference with the traditional American policy relating to its own protection from possible dangers from abroad. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government would be expected to send from abroad any additional guards that may be found to be needed. The Ambassador did not seem to be satisfied

with



with any sort of answer I made. He continued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it were. I suddenly and emphatically interrupted him and with right inquired of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask all these detailed questions about a matter of no importance to his Government or to any other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desired now to know what the motive and purpose of his Government was for doing so. I said that there would never be any friction between my Government and any other government on account of anything unlawful or unfair that my Government may do, but that it would be due to something unlawful that another government may do. I added that I had devoted most of the past seven years to efforts at understanding and peaceful relations between our two Governments.

I then picked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in which the Japanese Government is reported to be discussing every day or two some phases of the Netherlands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I had not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each was obligated to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thought that settled the matter as among our four countries, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the status quo, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Japan, there was continually coming out of Tokyo additional discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to respect and preserve the status quo had not been made. I said that these were news reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to preserve understanding and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the part of the people in each country. I said that I would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Japan. I added finally that my Government strives for peace year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lie at the door of this Government. I said further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and preserve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunderstood.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he was subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated that his Government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the status quo in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four governments interested, and that it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them. I remarked that, since my /  
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Government was interested. I had made inquiries of the British and the French, and gathered the unequivocal understanding that they had no idea whatever to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies in any way.

The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the East Indies situation, and I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government that, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal access to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to impose in the Pacific Ocean area, the United States and other countries are to be denied equality of trade and industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation.

I again brought to his attention the information contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese newspapers, as stated, were undertaking to keep alive and emphasize some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there was an intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in every other part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. The Ambassador again stated that his Government was satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of each of the three other governments interested, and that they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contact the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his statement, but again reminded him of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japanese Government or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lines of discussion indicating a claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the status quo should be respected and preserved by each of the four governments; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said.

I still interpret the Ambassador's visit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Japan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the Netherlands East Indies.

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Doc. 220

Ex-1288

文書第二二〇、P号

米國、外交關係——日本第三卷一九三二年——一九四一年

二八五頁——二八六頁 八五六頁、〇/三二

米國々務長官覺書

一九四〇年五月十六日(華府)

日本大使ハ自ラ申シ出テ來訪シタ。「フリッツ」移  
民法案、既報、「ベル」及ビ特ニ蘭印ニ於ケル反  
日騷擾又ハ駐支歐軍ノ狀態ニ就イテ大使、何ラ  
語ラナカッタ。会谈、初ニ於イテ私ハ世界ノ他ノ地方  
ニ於イテ戰爭狀態ト混亂ガ増大シ、アラエル方面ニ  
ソノ恐ルベキ破壊的影響ガ現ハレテ年ル事ニ言及  
シ更ニ續ケテ大國ハ言フニ及バズ小國マデモガ何ラカ  
ノ武力的方法ニ依ル侵略的干涉ヲ免レズ故ニ各國  
ハ出來ル文武裝ヲ固メテ自國ノ權利及權益ガ  
武力又ハ武力ノ威嚇ニヨツテ干涉ヲ受ケ又標準  
備ヲ整ヘル他ハナイガ如キ狀態ニ立至ツタ様ニ思  
ハルト述ベタ。私ハ更ニ語り、幸ヒ本日國會ニ於  
イテ示サレタ様ニ、又平和ナ弱小國ヲ破壊セントス  
ル侵略ガ最近行ハレテ以來全世界ニ明ラカニ  
ナツタ様ニ今日米國民ハ自國ノ權利及權益ヲ  
嚇カサレル事ニ就イテ非常ニ自覺メテ油斷ナ  
ク警戒スル様ニナツテ居ルガコレハ米國ノ外交ノ  
任ニ當ツテ居ル我々ニ取ツテ、非常ニ満足スベキ  
事デアルト述ベタ



次イデ大使ハ「グラカオ」及ビ「アルバ」ヲ包含スル  
 蘭領西印度ニ関シ長時間ニ亘ツテ私ニ質問  
 及ビ反對訊問ヲ試ミタ。私ハ次ギノ如ク答  
 ヘタ。勿論我政府及ビ他ノニ「アルバ」ノアメリカノ共  
 和國ハ此半球ノ安全ニ関スル各國ノ傳統的政策  
 ヲ聊カモ離反スル考ヘハナク、若シ大使ノ念  
 頭ニアル事カコノ「アルバ」私ハ今述ベタ事ニ  
 加ヘ更ニ次ギノ如ク言明スル事ガ出來ル即チ「ク  
 ラカオ」及ビ「アルバ」近海ヲ警戒中ノ英佛艦隊  
 ハ「オランダ」政府ニ事アル場合ノ援助ヲ約シ  
 南米諸國ニオイテ屢々政權ガ篡奪サレル  
 様ニコレヲノ領土ノ一方カ或ハ兩方ヲ篡奪ス  
 ル企圖ノ許ニ万一二モ大陸カラ妨害ヤ遠征  
 軍カ來ナイヨウニ防衛示シテキルトイフ事實  
 ヲ知ルヤ否ヤ我政府ハカナル危險カラコレ  
 ラノ島々及其ノ政府ヲ保護スルタメニ「オ  
 ランダ」守備隊及「ク」ラカオ「アルバ」兩島  
 民ニドレ程ノ力カアルカニ関シテ出來ル丈迅  
 速ニ事實ノ調査收拾ニ着手シタデアルト

Doc. 2207

次イテ大使ハ「グラカオ」及ビ「アルバ」ヲ包含スル  
蘭領西印度ニ関シ長時間ニ亘ツテ私ニ質問  
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ハ「オランダ」政府ニ事アル場合、援助ヲ約シ  
南米諸國ニオイト屢々政權が暴奪サレル  
様ニコレヲ、領土ノ一方カ或ハ両方ヲ暴奪ス  
ル企圖ノ計ニ万一二モ大陸カラ妨害ヤ遠征  
軍が來ナイヨウニ防禦シテキルトイフ事實  
ヲ知ルヤ否ヤ我政府ハカナル危険カラコ  
ラノ島々及其ノ政府ヲ保護スルタメニ「オ  
ランダ」守備隊及「クラカオ」「アルバ」兩島  
民ニドレ程ノ力がアルカニ関シテ出來ル又迅  
速ニ事實ノ調査收拾ニ着手シタデアルト。



Doc-220P

私、考へ依り、英佛哨海艦隊ハコシ、島ニ關シテ  
決テ「オランダ」政府ニ干渉シテヤル、テハ、先述、如キ危  
險ヨリ、ナル爲、援助ニ必要ト思ハルル短、期間ニ於テソレ、  
政府、權威ヲ認メテ、ターゲアリ、又今後復、哨海作業ガ  
繼續スル場合ニ保護ヲ強化スル爲ニ哨海艦艇ヲ増加スル、  
フガ如キ事、ニ、自ラ明カニシタ、ソレ故外部ノ危険ニ對スル自  
己防衛ニ關スル米國、傳統的政策ニ干渉トイフ問題、起  
ル余地、ハ、更ニ「オランダ」政府、後日、少シヤナリト思ハル  
備矢ヲ送ル事モ予期セラレ、大使、私、ド、返答ニモ満足  
ス、更ニ段々ト細部ニ亘ッテ、箇向シ、反對、訊問トモ、云フベキモ、ラ、試  
ミタ。

私ハ、突然、強ク彼ヲ遮フ、若シモ貴方、政府、ハ、自今、モ、又  
他、ド、政府、モ、何、等、重要性、ノ、事柄、ニ、就、テ、カ、ル、詳細、ト  
質問、ラ、サ、ヤ、ル、爲、ニ、貴方、ラ、私、許、ニ、ヨ、コ、シ、タ、イ、デ、アル、カ、ラ、当然、  
ノ、事、ト、シ、テ、尋、ネ、若シモ貴方、政府、ガ、カ、ル、殆、ド、果、テ、  
質問、ラ、ス、ル、爲、ニ、貴方、ラ、苛、越、シ、タ、ト、ス、レ、テ、ラ、一、体、ト、シ、テ、動  
機、ト、目的、ヲ、ソ、ウ、シ、タ、カ、知、リ、タ、イ、ト、尋、ナ、リ。

我政府、ガ、何、カ、不法、ト、或、ハ、不、当、ト、事、ラ、ハ、本、カ、シ、テ、我政府  
ト、他、政府、ト、ノ、間、ニ、不、和、ガ、起、ル、ト、イ、フ、事、ハ、決、ニ、ア、リ、得、ナ  
リ、若シカ、ル、事、ガ、起、ル、ト、ス、レ、バ、ソ、レ、他、政府、ガ、何、カ、不法、ト  
事、ラ、ス、ル、場合、デ、アル、ト、述、ベ、テ、更、ニ、言、葉、ヲ、續、ケ、テ、自  
介、ハ、兩、政、府、間、ノ、了、解、及、平、和、的、關、係、ヘ、努、力、ノ、爲、ニ  
過、去、十、年、間、大、部、分、ヲ、捧、ゲ、タ、イ、デ、アル、ト、附、言、シ、タ。

次ギニ私ハ印爲電信機ニ依リ東京カラ来ル材料ノ  
 ニ三頁ヲ取上ケテソレニ日本政府ハ毎日或ハ隔日ニ  
 蘭領東印度、或局面又彼等ガソコニ於テ有スルト  
 自任シテナル權益ニ就テ論ジテキルト報ジテキル  
 私ハコレヲ別ニ彼ニ示スワモリハ無カフタガ彼ガ丁度室  
 ニ入ワテ来タ時ソレハ机ノ上ニ置カレタバカリデアワタリト話  
 シタ然シテ日本政府及ヒ米英佛各政府ハ各ニ最近  
 各國ハ蘭領東印度ノ現状維持ヲ尊重スベキ義  
 務アリト以前ノ公約ヲ繰返シト認メラレタリ  
 各國ハ明瞭ニ一現状維持ヲ尊重ヲ誓約シタ故以  
 上ノ事ヨリテ問題ハ四國間ニ於テ解決ヲ見タモルト  
 自分デ考ヘテタ旨ヲ強調シタ然シ更ニ續ケテ我々ノ中ノ  
 多クノ者が日本政府ト十分ナル了解ヲ保タウト努力  
 シタニテ拘ラズアタカモ現状維持ヲ尊重保持ノ誓約  
 ガサレカワタ様ニ東京カラハ引續イテ蘭領東印度  
 ニ關スル論議ガ齎レルト述ベタ  
 コレハ新聞報道デマリ私自身直々ニソレヲ信スルモ  
 テハナリガ報道ノ論調ハ兩國國民間ニ誤解ヲ生  
 デシメ敵愾心ヲ増大シ兩國間ニ理解ト公平ヲ行  
 動ト公平ヲ取扱ヲ保タウトスルノ大儀ト私及ビ他  
 ノ人々努力ヲ妨害スルモノデアルト言フタ



220P

私ハ若シソリシガ日本ニオケル紛争政策一部デアリナラ  
 今ソノ事ニツイテ異議ヲ挟ムモノデハナイト云ツル。  
 茲ニ私ハ我政府ハ終始平和ヲ爲シ努メシ。常ニ論争  
 ヲ避ケントスル意ニシテ居ルガ故ニ。若シ論争が起ルナラ  
 ソノ責ハ我ガ政府ニハナイデアラウト附言シタ。  
 更ニ讀イテ他國ト、間並ニ他國官ニオケル平和ヲ促  
 進シ且保持セシトスル我々、恒久的ナ希望及努力  
 ヨリ言ツテ、斯ノ如キ我々ノ態度ニツイテ誤解ナカラシ  
 フトヲ希望スト云々云々加ヘタ。

大使ハ答ヘテ日本政府ハ別ニ特別ノ目的ヲ以テ彼ヲ私  
 断ニ派遣シテ先般私ニ述ベラレタナリ時丁長仕掛  
 ケテキタ長イ詔問ヲサセタ誤デハナイト否定シタ。  
 次イテ彼ハ日本政府ハ關係四ヶ國、各々が蘭領印をニツ  
 イテノ現状ヲ維持スルトイフコトヲ繰返シテ以來、狀態ニ  
 全ク満足シテ居リ、且英佛兩國政府ガ蘭印保護ノタメ  
 軍隊ヲ上陸セシメナイ限り、ソノ事ニ關シハコソ、論争ヲ  
 起ス何ラノ意圖モ有スルモノデハナイト繰返シタ。

私ハ我政府ハコレニ関心ヲ有スルガ故ニ、自分ヲ英佛兩國  
 政府ニ問合せ、彼ラハ如何ナル方法ニテモ蘭領東印を  
 干渉スル考ハ全然ナイトイフコトヲ明確ニ了解シタ  
 旨ヲ述ベタ。

次イテ大使ハ西印各ノ情勢ニツイテ「モンロー」主義ニ言及  
 シタ。ソコデ私ハ答ヘテ「モンロー」主義、下デハ日本ノ商  
 船ハ西半球、各衆國ト「ギンバ」間、特別協定ヲ除

220P

凡そ、港ニ三等ニ便泊ヲ得ルニ及ビ、日本政府ガ太平洋  
 地域ニ於テ抑シ付ケヨウトシテキル政策ニヨルト、合衆  
 国及ソノ他ノ國々ハ中國ノ各港ニ於テ、通商工業上ノ  
 機會ノ平等ヲ拒絶セラレテナルガ、彼ノ政府ハコノ予盾  
 スル情勢ヲ満足シテ跳ヌテキルヤウニ思ハレルトイフコト  
 ヲ、彼ノ政府ニ指摘セントシタガ、各駁ラシク見エルト答  
 ヘリ。再び私ハ大使ニ同シ、今日東京カラ来タ印電ヲ電  
 信機報告ニ依リバ日本ノ對テハ日本ガ南印東印ニ  
 或ル特殊ノ權益ヲ有シテキルト自任シテキルヲ就イテ  
 繰返シ言續ケテ強調シテキルト、事ニ意ヲ促シタ。

(次頁)



私ハ更ニ述ベリ。知リテ非常ニ驚キ。其ハ日本政府ハ大ニ中華民国ニ擴張セリトナリ。後ニ續道見ルト。日本ハ世界ノ他ノイニズレノ方面ニオケテモ通商機會均等ヲ要求シ。續キテ其ハ他國ノ通商機會均等ヲ拒絶セリトナリ。其ハ三ノ哩モ延ビテ東印度ヲ構成ス。一大群島ヲ密カニ採取ス。其ハ満足シテイトイフ事オボノカレリ。其ハアリ又。他ノ諸國ガ日本側ノ通商機會均等ニ全然干渉シテハハフシラ國ニ何等ノ利益的又ハ他ノ理由ガアリカラデアルト。

大使ハ再ビ述ベテ。日本政府ハ關係アル他ノ三國政府ガ各、再ビ新シク約束シテ事ニ鑑ミ。南領東印度ノ狀態ニ満足シテ居リ又現地ニ駐ミ。南領東印度ト折衝スル様ナ計ニ畫モ目的モナイビヨリ言明シタリ。

秋篠ノ言明ニ満足ノ意ヲ表シタリ。其ハ再ビ彼ニ告ゲテ自分ハドウシテモ日本政府ノ政策ヲ又ハ日本ノ新聞ノ政策カドカラ解ラヌカ。日本ノ南領東印度ノ場合ニ或ル種ノ特殊權益ヲ有スルトノ主張ヲ繰返シテ色々論ジテ其ノハ了解ニ苦シムヲデアリ又最近ノ聲明ニオキテ四國政府ハ各、現状維持ヲ尊重シ維持セオナリ又トイフ。我政府ノ態度ヲ広拓固ニ易ク簡勁ニ述ベタリ。及ビ提出フレリ實際ノ問題ハ實ハ全太平洋域ニ關スルデアリ。其ハ問題ニ就イテノ私ノ最近ノ聲明以上ニ私ガコレヲ述ベタリ。其ハ何ヲ別ニ加ヘルモリナイト云フ。

私ハ大使ノ訪問ハ南領東印度ニ對スル日本ノ計畫及目的ニ關シテ日本ヲ支持スル為メ口實ヲ述ベシメントノ訓令ヲ許ニサレタモノト今尚解釈シタリ。

(コデル ハル)

DOCUMENT NO. 320 /v\

FOREIGN RELATIONS of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941 Page I  
 Vol. II, pp. 143-145  
 762.94/484: Telegram  
 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

(Paraphrase - Extracts)

Moscow, March 24, 1941--3 p.m.  
 (Received March 25--7.30 a.m. 12)

581. This morning I was given the opportunity by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to talk with Matsuoka <sup>13</sup> for an hour.

Matsuoka was emphatic in stating that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no territorial ambitions. Japan, he said, was ready at any moment to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippine Islands. As an evidence of Japan's lack of territorial ambitions, Matsuoka referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina. He said that Japan would not go to war with the United States, and added that from his reading of American history it appeared that it was the United States which went to war with other countries; if a conflict should take place it would come about only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.

Matsuoka said that he desired ardently to liquidate the war in China at the earliest possible date. Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help, he said, and any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-Japanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concerned, he was in a position to do it by bringing his influence to bear in this direction upon Chiang Kai-shek.

I asked him whether he had in mind terms which he was sure Chiang Kai-shek would be entirely willing to accept and which would meet with the President's approval. He replied that instructions had recently been sent to Nomura <sup>14</sup> to take the subject up with the President and to discuss with the latter the terms on which the Sino-Japanese war could be terminated. Matsuoka said that now was the time when statesmen should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not the little things" that matter; in his opinion the President is afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far Eastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he wished the President and the Secretary of State would trust him; on his record over the past few years, he said, he did not blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that Japan had no territorial or economic ambition, and that if an understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he would fight to put it through should any elements in Japan oppose it.

12 Telegram in three sections.

13 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on special mission to the Soviet Union.

14 Japanese Ambassador in the United States.

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 In



In reply to what he had first said, I merely suggested to Matsuoka that he instruct Nomura most explicitly as to exactly what was in his mind as a basis for ending the war with China, and that he leave nothing open either to chance or to misunderstanding. Again he was emphatic at this point in insisting on the acceptability of the terms which he had in mind.

Matsuoka characterized as "ridiculous" any fears which were expressed in the United States over interference with supplies of rubber and tin, as these commodities were obviously for consumption in the only market that was large enough to absorb them; namely, the United States. It would be folly, he said, to interfere with the export of these commodities to the United States.

. . . . .

He expressed the opinion that it was to the Soviet Union's interest to encourage war between Japan and the United States, and he said that he was well aware of the harm to Japan which would follow from any such conflict.

. . . . .

STEINHARDT

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Ex 1209 Doc 220 M

文書第二二〇 M

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

『一九三一年／昭和六年／ヨリ一九四一年／昭和十六年／ニ至ル日米外交關係』第二卷一四三頁  
一四四五頁

電報 七六二、九四／四八四

駐蘇大使（スタンハート）ヨリ

國務長官宛（敬衍一拔奉）

一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月二十四日午後三時モスコイ發信  
三月二十五日午前七時三十分受信（註、三部分カラ成ル電報）

ムヘ「今朝私ハ日本大使ノ招待デ一時間ニ亘リ松岡  
（註、日本外務大臣、蘇聯派遣特使）ト會談スル  
機會ヲ與ヘラレタ。

。。。。。。。。

松岡ハ如何ナル事情ガアツテモ日本ハ、シンガポ  
ール或ハ米、英、蘭ノ如何ナル領土ヲモ攻撃スル  
コトハナイト強調シ、又彼ハ日本ハ何等領土的野  
心ハ持ツテキナイト主張シ述ベタ。彼ハ日本ハ常  
ニ比隣諸島ノ領土ノ保全乃至獨立ヲ保障スルコ  
トニ合衆國ト協力スル用意ヲ有スルト言ツタ。日  
本ニ領土的野心ガナイト云フ「證左トシテ松岡ハ  
泰、佛印間紛争ニ對スル彼ノ仲介ノ成果ニ言及シ  
タ。彼ハ日本ハ合衆國ト紛争ヲシナイト言ヒ、又



2.

Doc 220 M

彼が願フタ米國史ニヨルト外國トノ戰爭ヲ始メタ  
ノハ合衆國デアツタトノヤウニ思ヘタ。若シ紛争  
ガ起ルトスレバ、ソレハ合衆國ノ積極的行動ノ結果ニ外  
ナラナイデアロウト附加ヘタ。

松岡ハ中國ニ於ケル戰爭ヲ出來ルダケ遠カニ終結  
サセルコトヲ熱望スルト言ツタ。蔣介石ハ米國ノ  
援助ニ願フテイルカラ米國大統領ガ關係國全部ノ  
満足シ得ル條件デ日華事變ヲ終結サセルコトヲ望  
ムナラバ、コノ方向ニ向ツテ彼ガ蔣介石ニ對シ其  
勢力ヲ用フルコトニヨツテソレヲ爲シ得ル立場ニ  
在ルノダト言ツタ。

私ハ彼ニ蔣介石ガ全面的ニ承諾シ、大統領モ是認  
スルト彼ガ確信シテイルヤウナ條件ヲ腹案トシテ  
持ツテイルカドウカ訊ネタ。彼ハ最近野村（註、  
陸米大使）ニ對シテ、コノ問題ヲ大統領ニ提起シ、  
日華事變ヲ終結シ得ル條件ヲ大統領ト討議スルヨ  
ウ指圖ヲ發シテアルト答ヘタ。松岡ハ今ヤ政治家  
ガ決然タル行動ヲトルベキ時デアツテ、問題トナ  
ルノハ「大キナ事柄デアツテ小サナ事柄デハナイ」  
ト述ベタ。又彼ノ意見デハ、大統領ハ日華事變ヲ  
終結シ得ル條件ヲ野村ト討議スルコトニヨツテ  
「極東ノ全狀勢ヲ明朗化スル」絶好ノ機會ヲ與ヘ  
ラレテイルノダト述ベタ。竊イテ彼ハ大統領ト國  
務長官ガ自分ヲ信用シテ欲シイ、過去數年間ノ自

分ノ記録ニ徴シテ、二人ガ自分ヲ信用シオカツタ  
事ヲ非難シナイ。彼等ガ機會サヘ與ヘテ吳レレバ  
自分ハ日本ニ領土的乃至經濟的野望ガナイコトヲ  
彼等ニ證明スル。而シテ若シ我々全部ガ合理的ト  
見ル諒解ガ遂ゲラレルナラバ、日本ノ如何ナル分  
子ガ反對シヨウトモ、自分ハソレヲ押通スト語ツ  
タ。

最初ニ彼ガ述べタコトニ對スル答トシテ、私ハ日  
華事變終結ノ基礎トナル彼ノ考ソノモノヲ、最も  
明確ニ野村ニ指圖シテ、機會依存若クハ誤解ノ余  
地ヲ殘サナイヨウニサレタイト言フニ止メタ。コ  
ノ點ニ於テ再ビ彼ハ、自分ノ考ヘテイル條件ガ受  
諾シ得ルモノデアルコトヲ強調シタ。

松岡ハゴム及錫ノ供給ガ妨害サレルノデハナイカ  
ト云フ危惧ガ合衆國ニ現ハレテイルガ、コレラノ  
商品ガ消化サレ得ル唯一ノ大市場、即チ合衆國ノ  
消費ノタメノ商品デアルコトハ明カデアルカラ、  
斯カル危惧ハ「馬鹿々々シキ事」ト言ツタ。彼ハ  
コレラノ商品ノ對米輸出ニ干涉スルコトハ馬鹿ラ  
シイコトダト述べタ。

。。。。。。。。

彼ハ日米戦争ヲ助長スルコトガ、蘇聯ノ利益ヲ害  
ストノ意見ヲ述べタ。又彼ハ右ノ如キ衝突ノ結果  
日本ガ蒙ルベキ損害ヲ自分ハ充分認識シテイルト  
述べタ。

スタインハート